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Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between cognitive abilities and
behavior in strategic-form games with the help of a novel experiment.
The design allows us ﬁrst to measure the cognitive abilities of sub-
jects without confound and then to evaluate their impact on behavior
in strategic-from games. We ﬁnd that subjects with better cognitive
abilities show more sophisticated behavior and make better use of
information on cognitive abilities and preferences of opponents. Al-
though we do not ﬁnd evidence for Nash behavior, observed behavior
is remarkably sophisticated, as almost 80% of subjects behave near
optimal and outperform Nash behavior with respect to expected pay-
oﬀs.
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Most strategic situations require individuals to make complex chains of rea-
soning, especially counter-factual reasoning of the type: “If I were my op-
ponent, I would not play action A because action B gives a strictly higher
payoﬀ regardless of the action I actually choose,” or “If my opponent con-
jectures that I play each of my actions with equal probability, then he would
play A and, thus, I should play B because it is my best-reply to A.” Quite
naturally, we can imagine arbitrarily complex chains of reasoning of this sort.
The cognitive ability of a person, i.e., his ability to make complex chains of
reasoning, is therefore likely to inﬂuence his behavior in strategic situations.
This paper addresses this issue. More precisely, the purpose of this paper is
to measure the ability of individuals to perform complex chains of reasoning
and to relate the measured cognitive abilities to behavior in strategic-form
games.
A main motivation for this work is to better understand reasons for hu-
mans deviating from theoretically postulated behavior, such as iterated dele-
tion of strictly dominated strategies or Nash equilibrium. If, for example,
the choice of an individual does not coincide with iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies and yet her cognitive abilities suggest that she is able to
draw the necessary logical inferences, then we might conclude that there is a
lack of common beliefs in rationality. After all, a common belief in rationality
implies that choices are consistent with iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. Ultimately, such a ﬁnding might call for solution concepts relaxing
the assumption of common (or even mutual) beliefs in rationality.
With this objective in mind, we design a novel series of experiments,
which allow us to address the issues raised above. Our experiments have two
essential components. The ﬁrst component tests the ability of individuals to
perform complex chains of reasoning, in particular counter-factual reasoning.
We employ a computerized variant of the red-hat puzzle, as introduced in
Bayer and Renou (2007). This computerized variant of the red-hat puzzle
1is ideal to measure the cognitive abilities of individuals as it neatly controls
for confounding factors, such as other-regarding preferences or beliefs about
the cognitive abilities of others. The second component of the experiments
presents the subjects with twelve strategic-form games. Ten of these are
dominance solvable, for which the logic for iterated deletion of strictly dom-
inated strategies closely parallels the logic underlying the red-hat puzzles.
We add two dictator games, which are designed as a control for preferences.
We use the choice made by the subjects in the twelve strategic-form
games to identify diﬀerent behavioral types. Following recent studies, such
as Stahl and Wilson (1994; 1995), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Costa-Gomes
and Weizs¨ acker (2008), we estimate a mixture density model, where each
subject’s behavior is determined, possibly with errors, by one of a rich set
of possible behavioral types. Although we consider a rich set of ﬁfteen pos-
sible behavioral types, only six of them are of signiﬁcant importance in the
sample. We now describe these six types. An Altruistic type identiﬁes the
strategy proﬁle that maximizes the sum of his own and the opponent’s pay-
oﬀ and chooses the corresponding action. An Optimistic type identiﬁes the
strategy proﬁle that maximizes his payoﬀ and takes the corresponding ac-
tion (i.e., “maxmax” behavior). An L0 player uniformly randomizes over
his actions. The more sophisticated L1 type (Naive in Stahl and Wilson;
1994 and 1995) best replies to L0. An L2 type is even more sophisticated
and best replies to L1. Lastly, a D1 player does one round of deletion of
strictly dominated strategies and best replies to a uniform distribution over
the opponent’s remaining strategies.
We now summarize the main results of the paper. Firstly, from the red-
hat puzzles, we derive an index of cognitive ability for each subject. The
index ranges from zero to four and can be interpreted as a subject’s depth of
reasoning. In particular, a subject with a cognitive ability of two or more has
the ability to put himself in the position of the opponent (strategic thinking),
while a subject with a cognitive ability of one or less cannot. In the sample
of 154 subjects, the percentage of subjects showing an iteration depth of
2zero, one, two, three and four is 0%, 52.6%, 24.03%, 5.84% and 17.53%,
respectively. About one-half of the subjects can think strategically.
Secondly, the econometric analysis of behavioral types gives a relatively
simple description of subjects’ behaviors. As already alluded to, the most
informative statistical model identiﬁes six behavioral types, Altruistic, Opti-
mistic, L0, L1, L2 and D1 with percentages of 6.50%, 1.95%, 11.69%, 62.99%,
14.94% and 1.95%, respectively. Most subjects (about 77%) are best classi-
ﬁed as L1 or L2 types. L1 is the modal type. This is in line with a result
from Costa-Gomes and Weizs¨ acker (2008), who found that L1 was the best
predictor for play in strategic-form games. We ﬁnd no statistical evidence
for the presence of Sophisticated (rational expectation) or Equilibrium types.
Some previous studies, e.g., Stahl and Wilson (1995), Haruvy et al. (1999)
and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), found some evidence for a small fraction of
equilibrium types.1 In accordance with most of the studies mentioned above,
we also ﬁnd some L2, D1 and Optimistic types. Unlike most previous studies,
we ﬁnd strong evidence for the existence of some Altruistic types.
Finally, we turn our attention to the relation between cognitive abilities
and behavioral types. The general pattern is as follows: the higher the index
of cognitive abilities, the more sophisticated (i.e., L1, L2 or D1) is the be-
havioral type. However, the impact of cognitive abilities is not as extreme as
one might have expected. Even the subjects with very good cognitive ability
are not behaving as L3 or Nash types, which are the most sophisticated
types we looked for. Yet, the observed L1 and L2 types’ expected payoﬀs
(given the distribution of play observed in the sample) are very high. The
expected payoﬀ of an L2 type is about 99% of that a player with rational
expectations, the ideal of game theory, would achieve. Our most prevalent
type, L1, still achieves 96% of the rational expectation payoﬀ. In contrast, a
1In their econometric analysis with information about search patterns, Costas-Gomez
et al. found no evidences for equilibrium types. In sharp contrast with our study and most
previous studies, Rey-Biel (2009) found that a large fraction of of subjects (70%) played
in agreement with Nash behavior.
3Nash type would achieve less than 90% of the rational expectation payoﬀ.2
In terms of outcomes, the subject’s behavior is quite sophisticated after all.
We also observe that subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more react
to information on their opponent, while subjects with a cognitive ability of
one do not. Moreover, subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more only
behave as Altruistic types if they are informed about opponents’ play in
the dictator games. Also, subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more
are more likely to behave as L2 types if information is provided about the
cognitive abilities of the opponents. Remarkably, all in all, about 80% of
our subjects show quite sophisticated behavior despite of an environment
that is quite unfamiliar to them (our subjects had not participated in prior
experiments).
This paper contributes to the large literature on iterative reasoning in
games e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Beard and Beil (1994), Nagel
(1995), Ho et al. (1998), Goeree and Holt (2004), Huyck et al. (2002), Cabr-
era et al. (2007), to name just a few.3 A recurring feature of many of these
studies is the use of games solvable by iterated deletion of strictly or weakly
dominated strategies. In these studies, the ability of individuals to perform
complex chains of reasoning is associated with their ability to iteratively
delete dominated strategies. Centipede games (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey,
1992) and beauty contest games (introduced to the literature by Nagel, 1995)
are two of the most commonly used games in that literature. Typically, the
use of these games suﬀers from the lack of control for beliefs about the ra-
tionality of others and for social preferences.4 The main novelty of our ex-
2L0 types achieve even less with about 80%.
3We refer the reader to chapter 5 of Camerer (2003) for a survey of earlier literature
on this topic.
4Gneezy et al. (2010) and Dufwenberg et al. (2010) use a version of the game “Nim” to
study if and how humans learn backward induction. Since players have (weakly) dominant
strategies, this zero-sum game can be used to measure the depth of iterative reasoning in
humans if one accepts the auxiliary hypothesis that it is common knowledge that players
do not play weakly dominated strategies.
4periment is that we are able to provide these controls. The second strand
of literature our paper is related to is that on behavioral types and behavior
in strategic-form games (see, among others, Stahl and Wilson, 1994; 1995;
Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes and Craw-
ford, 2006; Rey-Biel, 2009; Arad and Rubinstein, 2010 and Burchardi and
Penczynski, 2010).5
To summarize, the main objective of the paper is to understand how the
ability to perform complex chains of reasoning relates to behavior in strategic-
form games, controlling for other-regarding preferences. The experimental
design consists of three distinct stages. The ﬁrst stage provides a measure
of the ability of subjects to perform counter-factual reasoning. We use a
variant of the red-hat puzzle to obtain such a measure. The second stage
controls for other-regarding preferences by presenting the subjects with dic-
tator games. Finally, the last stage consists of twelve strategic-form games.
The paper is organized around these three stages. After brieﬂy describing
our subject sample in Section 2, Section 3 presents the red-hat puzzles, its
computerized experimental design and initial results. Section 4 describes
the dictator games. Section 5 presents the twelve strategic-form games, the
postulated behavioral types and our econometric analysis. Section 6 relates
the estimated behavioral types to cognitive abilities and preferences, while
Section 7 concludes.
2 Subject sample and procedure
The experiment was conducted at AdLab, the Adelaide Laboratory for Ex-
perimental Economics at the University of Adelaide in Australia. We used
Urs Fischbacher’s (2007) experimental software Z-tree. A total of 154 sub-
jects participated in eight sessions; all sessions took place over three days:
5Beyond the types typically considered, we also included types that capture other-
regarding preference (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Charness and Rabin (2002)) and
others we deemed promising.
526, 27 and 28 of November 2008. For each of our four treatments (which
we will explain later), we conducted two sessions resulting in between 36
and 42 subjects per treatment. A session lasted for about 90 minutes and
on average subjects earned about 20.4 Australian Dollars. Earnings ranged
from AUD 8 to AUD 36. The 154 participants were mostly students from the
University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia. All subjects
had no previous experience with participation in economic experiments. The
experimental instructions used are available on the author’s webpage.
3 Measuring cognitive abilities
This section presents the ﬁrst stage of our experiment, the red-hat puzzles,
and describes our measure of the ability of subjects to perform complex
chains of reasoning (for short, cognitive ability). Along with a measure of
“social preferences,” this measure of cognitive ability is at the heart of our
analysis of behavior in strategic-form games.
3.1 Experimental design
We ﬁrst present a simple puzzle, which is the basis for the ﬁrst stage of
our experiment. Each of N individuals has either a red hat or a white hat,
observes the hat color of others, but cannot observe the color of his own hat.
Along comes a trusted referee, who declares that “at least one individual has
a red hat on the head.” The referee then asks the following question: “What
is your hat color?” All individuals simultaneously choose an answer out of
“I can’t possibly know,” “I have a red hat,” or “I have a white hat.” Players
then learn the answers of the other players and are asked again what their
hat color is. This process is repeated until all individuals have inferred their
hat color. This problem is known as the red-hat puzzle (henceforth, RHP).6
6The same problem is also known as the “Dirty Faces Game.” For an alternative
exposition see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 544-548) or Osbourne and Rubinstein
(1994, p. 71).
6Suppose that an individual, say Bob, sees that no one else has a red
hat. Since it is commonly known that there is at least one red hat, he must
conclude that he has a red had. Now suppose that Bob sees one red hat, say
on Ann’s head. He should answer “I cannot possibly know” the ﬁrst time
the question is asked, as he sees another red hat. However, if Bob can iterate
his reasoning further, he can infer his hat color from Ann’s answer. If Ann
says “I cannot possibly know,” Bob must realize that he has a red hat. For
otherwise, Ann would have known that she has a red hat right away and
should have answered “I have a red hat.” In general, the greater the number
of red hats an individual observes, the more complex is the reasoning needed
to logically infer the color of one’s own hat. An individual needs m + 1
iteration steps to ﬁgure out his hat color, where m denotes the number of
red hats this individual observes.
It is important to note that the above logic for an individual correctly
inferring his hat color relies on some crucial assumptions. Firstly, even if an
individual has unlimited cognitive abilities, he also needs to know that the
answers of the other individuals are logically correct. To see this, suppose
that there is a unique red hat and Bob observes this red hat. Bob can
only correctly infer his hat color (white) if the individual, who wears the
red hat, answers the ﬁrst question accurately with “I have a red hat.” It
follows that any experimental design using the red-hat puzzle to measure the
cognitive ability of humans has to make sure that each subject knows that the
answers of other subjects are logically correct. Secondly, the event “There
is at least one red hat” must be common knowledge. Thirdly, subjects must
have incentives to correctly infer their hat color and to truthfully report their
logical inferences.
We now describe our experimental protocol, and how it addresses the
diﬃculties discussed above. In our experiment, a human subject was paired
with three computers, which were acting as “players.” Pairing a subject
with computers has several advantages given our objective. Firstly, we can
reasonably assume that subjects have no concerns for the eventual “pay-
7oﬀs” of computers. Secondly, we can ensure that a subject knows that the
computers’ answers are logically correct by a) programming the computer-
players to choose the logically correct answers and b) communicating this
credibly to the subject. Accordingly, computers were programmed to choose
the logically correct answers in each round of questions (see below), and the
instructions emphasized this point heavily. Additionally, subjects were told
(and constantly reminded with an on-screen message) that there was at least
one red hat.
Subjects were asked to infer their hat color from the information given to
them. At any point when they were asked, they had three possible answers to
choose from: “I have a WHITE hat with certainty,” “I have a RED hat with
certainty,” and “I cannot possibly know.” The ﬁrst time a subject had to
choose an answer within a puzzle the information a subject had was the hat
color of the three computer-players (along with the fact that there was at least
one red hat). In any subsequent round within the puzzle, the information
a subject had was the complete history of all answers of all players (the
computers’ and his) in all previous rounds. Similarly, the initial information
a computer-player had was the hat color of the two other computers and the
human subject and, subsequently, the complete history of answers. Whenever
a computer had to answer, the computer’s answer was the (unique) logically
correct answer inferred from their information and history. Before subjects
started the experiment, they had to answer some control questions testing
their understanding of the instructions.
A RHP was stopped after either a wrong answer by the human or a correct
announcement of the hat color.7 This stopping procedure is necessary to
avoid logical inconsistencies. Suppose there is only one red hat, which is worn
by the human subject. The subject initially observes three white hats. Now,
if the subject (wrongly) answers “I cannot possibly know,” then computers
should logically infer and, if allowed, answer “I have a red hat.” However, this
7In a given round, announcing a hat color was correct only if it was actually possible
to infer the hat color at this given round.
8contradicts what the subject observes. Although the computers in this case
would chose the logically correct answers, we would have lost control over how
a subject interprets this inconsistency. We believe that the observation of
contradicting computer announcements and physical reality would have led
subjects to believe that the computers were not properly programmed or that
our claim that the computers are logically correct was based on deception.
Since each individual was paired with three computers, we had seven
possible distinct logical situations. A logical situation was determined by
the number of red hats a subject saw and whether the subject had a red or
white hat herself. The more red hats a subject was observing, the more steps
(iterations) were required to correctly infer the hat color.
Subjects played all seven situations in increasing order of diﬃculty and
without any feedback in between. For any mistake, we deducted 2.5 Aus-
tralian Dollars (AUD) from the subjects start-up amount of AUD 20.00. As
any mistake immediately terminates a RHP, subjects payout from the ﬁrst
stage of the experiment could be calculated as AUD 2.5 for the show-up fee
plus AUD 2.5 per puzzle correctly solved. We used the frame of “deduction
per mistake” in order to make the incentive to think hard at every step of
the game as strong as possible (given our ﬁnancial means).8
3.2 A measure of cognitive ability
This section brieﬂy examines the determinants to correctly infer one’s hat
color in red-hat puzzles. All our results are consistent with a prior experi-
ment we ran and thus refer the reader to our companion paper, Bayer and
Renou (2009), for an in-depth analysis. Table 1 reports the percentage of
subjects over the entire sample who correctly solved a puzzle (as a function
of the number of steps needed to solve it). Some remarks are worth mak-
8For our subjects losing AUD 2.5 with a single wrong decision is quite a strong incentive.
A student job pays about ten Dollars per hour (the median hourly wage in South Australia
is about AUD 20). We also conjecture that the loss frame increases eﬀort through loss-
aversion.
9ing. Firstly, as expected, the more iterations are required to correctly infer
ones hat color, the lower is the percentage of correct answers. Secondly,
and somewhat surprisingly, there is almost no diﬀerence between solving a
puzzle requiring three iterations and one requiring four iterations (26.6% vs.
26.3%), while there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between solving a puzzle requir-
ing two iterations and one requiring three or four. This suggests that if an
individual can perform three steps of iterative reasoning, then she can also
do four steps. Our econometric analysis conﬁrms this empirical observation.
Thirdly, and reassuringly, all subjects were able to solve the easiest puzzle,
i.e., to state that they had a red hat when they were observing three white
hats.
steps 1 2 3 4
solved in % 100.00 55.5 26.6 26.3
Table 1: Correctly solved puzzles by iteration steps required
We now consider the determinants of correctly inferring ones hat color.
The dependent variable is “correct,” a dichotomous variable indicating whether
a subject had correctly inferred his hat color in a given puzzle. Our econo-
metric model is a probit model with subject speciﬁc random eﬀects. Table 2
reports the marginal eﬀects averaged over the whole sample.
Our regression conﬁrms our initial observation: the more steps required
to solve a puzzle, the less likely it is that an individual solves it (p < 0.01,
Wald test). The probability of solving a puzzle requiring three steps is 0.358
lower than the probability of solving puzzles requiring two steps (the ref-
erence). Moreover, as already suggested, there is no statistical diﬀerence
between solving a puzzle requiring three steps and a puzzle requiring four
steps. We also note that the probability of correctly solving puzzles of dif-
ferent diﬃculties is highly correlated within subjects (ρ = 0.62). The high
correlation within subjects testiﬁes of a large heterogeneity in cognitive abil-
ities across subjects, which cannot be explained by demographics. This also
10Probability of solving puzzle (estimated baseline) 0.251
Dependent variables Marginal eﬀect SE
Iteration steps necessary (baseline: 2 steps)
3 steps −0.358∗∗ (0.048)
4 steps −0.362∗∗ (0.048)
High school maths −0.016 (0.109)
Control questions ok 0.204∗∗ (0.072)
Age dummies not sig.
Male 0.166 (0.202)
Session dummies not sig.
Course dummies (baseline: Arts)











22, Wald test 105.12∗∗
ρ 0.615∗∗ (0.052)
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 2: Random-eﬀect panel estimation of the probability of a correct
solution
indicates that there is some consistency within subjects: correctly solving a
certain puzzle increases the likelihood of solving another puzzle.
We now construct a simple measure of cognitive ability so as to quantify
the number of steps of iterative reasoning an individual is able to perform.
Each puzzle can be parameterized by a pair (m,n), where m is the number of
red hats a subject observes and n is the actual number of red hats (n = m+1
or n = m). Remember that if a subject observes m red hats, m+1 iterations
11are required to correctly infer his hat color: the higher m is, the more complex
is the chain of reasoning. In our experiment, we had seven possible situations:
(0,1), (1,1), (1,2), (2,2), (2,3), (3,3) and (3,4).
A perfect measure would obtain if a subject solving a puzzle requiring
m iterations had actually solved all puzzles requiring m′ ≤ m iterations. In
this idealized situation, the measure of cognitive ability of a subject would
be given by the number of iterations required to solve the most diﬃcult
puzzle the subject can solve. For instance, if a subject had correctly solved
the puzzles (0,1), (1,1), (1,2) and failed the puzzles (2,2), (2,3), (3,3) and
(3,4), his measure of cognitive ability would be 2. Such a measure is called a
perfect Guttman scale (Guttman 1944; 1950) in the psychological literature.
It is, however, unreasonable to expect all subjects to exhibit a consistent
pattern of answers.9 For instance, a subject might fail to solve a puzzle of a
given complexity for reasons (e.g., trembles, mistakes, inattention) unrelated
to his ability to perform chains of reasoning. Alternatively, a subject might
correctly solve a puzzle by sheer luck. Quite surprisingly, 78.6% of the sub-
jects nonetheless exhibit a consistent pattern in our sample. Still, we have
to deal with the inconsistent patterns of answers.
The measure we adopt has the following features. First, it is an integer
ranging from 0 (all puzzles incorrectly solved) to 4 (all puzzles correctly
solved). Moreover, it makes a unique prediction about the puzzles a subject
can solve. For instance, if the measure of cognitive ability of an individual
is 2, it predicts that the individual solves the puzzles (0,1), (1,1) and (1,2)
and fails all others. Second, it maximizes the number of correct predictions.
To clarify this last point, consider the following situation (“Y” stands for
“correctly solved” and “N” for “failed”):
(0,1) (1,1) (1,2) (2,2) (2,3) (3,3) (3,4)
Y Y N Y Y Y Y
9A pattern of answers is consistent if there exists a threshold m∗ such that a subject
correctly solves all puzzles requiring m ≤ m∗ iterations and fails all other puzzles.
12The subject has correctly solved all puzzles but (1,2). If we ascribe the
measure 4 to the individual, we predict that he can solve all puzzles and thus
make one prediction error. If, however, we ascribe any other number, we
make at least two wrong predictions since we would predict that he cannot
solve puzzles (3,3) and (3,4). Thus, we attribute the failure to solve puzzle
(1,2) to a mistake. Alternatively, if an individual had solved puzzles (0,1)
and (3,4) and failed all others, his measure would be one. The fact that the
individual has solved the puzzle (3,4) would be attributed to sheer luck.
Two additional remarks are worth making. First, if an individual has
a consistent pattern of answers, then our measure coincides with a perfect
Guttman scale. Second, two diﬀerent numbers can correctly predict the
same number of outcomes. In all such situations, we decided to follow the
more conservative approach of assigning the lowest number maximizing the
number of correct predictions. Nonetheless, all our results are robust to this
choice. The two resulting measures are highly correlated (ρ > 0.86). A
standard criterion for a good measure and the existence of a one-dimensional
hierarchical scale is that the coeﬃcient of reproducibility (i.e. the fraction of
correctly predicted outcomes) is above 0.9, Guttmann (1950). Our measure
satisﬁes this criterion, as it predicts 91.5 percent of the outcomes correctly.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of our measure across subjects.
4 Social preferences
In the second stage of the experiment, subjects were presented with a dictator
game, designed to provide a crude measure of social preferences. The dictator
could implement three diﬀerent allocations: A = (4.5,4.5), B = (6.0,1.5) and
C = (3.0,9.0), expressed in Australian Dollar and with the ﬁrst coordinate
representing the monetary payoﬀ of the dictator. Subjects had to choose be-
tween A, B or C and then to conﬁrm their choices, so as to minimize the rate
of possible mistakes. We divided the subjects into two equal groups, G1 and
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Measure of cognitive ability
Distribution of cognitive abilities
Figure 1: Empirical distribution of the measure of cognitive ability
subjects from G2 and assigned the role of dictators. Subsequently, subjects
from G2 were assigned the role of dictators and anonymously paired with a
member of G1 diﬀerent from the initial match. No feedback was provided.
A selﬁsh dictator would choose option B. For a person to choose A or
C, other-regarding preferences are necessary. For a subject to choose A over
B, the concern for the other subject must be large enough such that the
increase in the payoﬀ of the other subjects compensates for the loss in one’s
own payoﬀ. For a player to prefer C over the other two options, the concern
for the other subjects must be even greater. Also, note that the total surplus
increases from B to A and from A to C.
Our choice of allocations was guided by the idea that a person who prefers
C is keen on social eﬃciency and has strong social preferences. A person
who chooses A tends to dislike inequity, whereas a person who chooses B is
relatively selﬁsh. For our purpose, such an admittedly crude classiﬁcation of
subjects is suﬃcient.
In our sample of 154 subjects, 27% have chosen alternative A, 50% alter-
native B, and 23%, alternative C.
145 Behavior in games
The last stage of our experiments consisted of twelve strategic-form games.
Each player had three pure strategies in each game. All but two games
were dominance solvable and each game has a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.10 More precisely, in three games, one round of deletion led to
the subject’s equilibrium strategy (i.e., the subject had a dominant strategy).
Two and three rounds of deletion were required in three games each, whereas
there was one game requiring four rounds. The games are presented in the
Appendix.
Six games and their respective transposed constitutes our twelve games;
most of them taken from Costa-Gomes and Weizs¨ acker (2008). Moreover,
all games were presented to the subjects as if they were row players. Thus,
subjects were actually playing the same twelve games and had the same
view of each game, i.e., the view of a row player. We randomized the order
of the games so as to control for possible order eﬀects. We had four diﬀerent
sequences of games, in which a subject never played a game and its transposed
in succession.11
A subject was initially seeing his own payoﬀ, but not the payoﬀ of his
opponent. He had to wait for 15 seconds before being able to see the payoﬀ
of his opponent; he had to click on a button to do so.12
The monetary payoﬀ from the second and third stage of the experiment
consisted of the payoﬀ obtained in two randomly chosen games out of the
fourteen games played in phases two and three (twelve strategic-form games,
10In all dominance solvable games, a strictly dominated strategy was dominated by a
pure strategy.
11We found no order eﬀects.
12We included the delay and the option to view the payoﬀ of one’s opponent to gather
some additional information. For instance, a selﬁsh player who has a dominant strategy
does not have to view the payoﬀ of his opponent. Yet, mere curiosity might induce a
player to view the payoﬀ of his opponent even if it is not needed; the delay was included
to discourage curious subjects to view the payoﬀ of their opponents. Unfortunately, this
did not help us.
15one dictator game as the dictator and one as the receiver). Subjects were
informed about this in the instructions.
5.1 Treatments, matching and information.
To summarize, we obtain a measure of the ability to perform complex chains
of reasoning with the red-hat puzzle. To control for social preferences, we
use dictator games. We randomly rematched subjects in between stage two
and three of the experiment and informed subjects of that procedure. No
feedback was provided during stage three (i.e., the strategic-form games).
The experiment consist of four diﬀerent treatments, which diﬀer in the
level of information given to subjects in stage three. In the fullinfo treatment,
subjects were told which option the opponent had chosen in the dictator
game and how many RHPs the opponent had correctly solved. The number
of RHPs solved is a signal about the depth of reasoning of the opponent,
whereas the choice in the dictator game is a signal about the opponent’s
preferences. In the red-hat treatment, only the number of correctly solved
RHPs is provided. In the dictator treatment, the subjects were only told
the opponent’s choice in the dictator game, while in the noinfo treatment no
information was provided.
5.2 Nash behavior
This section brieﬂy comments on the overall compliance with the concept of
Nash equilibrium. To be precise, let G be one of the twelve strategic-form
games subjects were presented with. (Remember that all games had a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.) We say that a subject plays according
to the concept of Nash equilibrium if he plays the equilibrium strategy of
G.13
13We need to be cautious here. Let G be one of the twelve strategic-form games of
the experiment and ui : ×Ai → R the payoﬀ function in game G. The “experimen-
tally postulated” preferences for player i is <i, where (ai,a−i) <i (a′
i,a′
−i) if and only if
ui(ai,a−i) ≥ ui(a′
i,a′
−i). However, if player i’s true preferences <∗
i diﬀer from the “exper-
16Solvable in 1 round 2 rounds 3 rounds 4 rounds ∞ rounds
Nash behavior 66.67% 36.80% 32.03% 32.47% 15.58%
Table 3: Fraction of Nash behavior as a function of rounds of deletion
Table 3 reports the percentage of subjects’ behavior consistent with the
concept of Nash equilibrium, as a function of number of rounds of iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies required. The percentages are sur-
prisingly low. In games with a strictly dominant strategy, subjects chose the
Nash strategy about two-thirds of the time, but the fraction drops to only
about one-third for games where two, three or four rounds of iteration are
necessary. In games that are not dominance solvable, the percentage drops
even further. Tests of proportions reveal that the fraction of Nash behavior
is higher in games with a strictly dominant strategy than in all other games
(p < 0.01 for all pairwise comparisons) and lower in games, which are not
dominance solvable, than in all other games (p < 0.01 for all comparisons).
Comparing the percentage of Nash behavior to one third, i.e., as if sub-
jects play each of their actions with equal probability (L0 type), shows that
for games with a strictly dominant strategy, the percentage is signiﬁcantly
higher (p < 0.01, binomial distribution test). Strikingly, for games that are
not dominance solvable, the percentage of Nash behavior is signiﬁcantly lower
than one-third (p < 0.01). For the remaining games, the percentages of Nash
behavior are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one-third.
Overall, the low agreement with Nash behavior and the fact that the
percentage of Nash behavior is signiﬁcantly lower than one-third in the most
diﬃcult games suggest the following. Firstly, Nash behavior seems to be a
poor predictor for the behavior of the subjects. Secondly, subjects are likely
to use other heuristics than Nash behavior. In what follows, we consider a
imentally postulated” preferences <i, he might still play an equilibrium strategy of the
game induced by his true preferences and yet would appear to us, the experimentalists, as
if he is not playing according to the concept of Nash equilibrium.
17rich set of behaviors, including Nash behavior, and estimate the likelihood
for the observed play to be consistent with our behavioral types.
5.3 Behavioral types
So far, we have devoted our analysis to the solution concept of Nash equi-
librium. As already alluded to, a subject’s preferences can coincide with
the “experimentally postulated” preferences, have unlimited cognitive abil-
ities and yet not play a Nash equilibrium. For instance, the subject might
be doubtful about the rationality of his opponent or might have speciﬁc
conjectures about his opponent, so that deviations from Nash behavior do
not imply bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences. After all, if
a subject expects his opponent to play a certain action, even if it is strictly
dominated, it is optimal to best-reply to it.
To address this issue, we postulate that a subject can be one of ﬁfteen
possible behavioral types, labeled Altruistic, Pessimistic, Optimistic, L0, L1,
L2, L3, D1, D2, Equilibrium, Sophisticated, Regret, Best-reply to Altruistic,
Inequity Aversion, and Eﬃciency. Altruistic takes the decision corresponding
to the proﬁle of decisions that maximizes the sum of his own and opponent’s
payoﬀs. Pessimistic takes the decision that maximizes his minimal payoﬀ
over his opponent’s decision. Optimistic takes the decision that maximizes
his maximal payoﬀ over his opponent’s decision. L0 uniformly randomizes
over his actions. L1 conjectures that his opponent plays each of his actions
with equal probability and best-replies to this conjecture, i.e., L1 best replies
to L0. L2 best replies to L1, i.e., he conjectures that his opponent plays ac-
cording to L1 and best replies to this conjecture. Similarly, L3 best replies
to L2. D1 does one round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies, con-
jectures that his opponent plays each of the remaining strategies with equal
probability, and best replies to this conjectures. D2 does two rounds of
deletion of strictly dominated strategies, conjectures that his opponent plays
each of the strategies remaining with equal probability, and best replies to his
conjectures. Equilibrium conjectures that the opponent plays a Nash equilib-
18rium strategy and best replies to this conjecture. Sophisticated best replies
to the empirical distribution of played actions in each game. The ten behav-
ioral types we have described so far are borrowed from Nagel (1995), Stahl
and Wilson (1995) and Costas-Gomez et al. (2001). We have also considered
three additional types that we ex-ante deemed promising. Regret minimizes
his maximal regret over the decision of his opponent. Best-reply to Altruistic
best replies to Altruistic. Inequity Aversion and Eﬃciency take equilibrium
decisions, but with other-regarding preferences ` a la Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
for inequity aversion and ` a la Charness and Rabin (2002) for eﬃciency.14
5.3.1 The statistical model
This section presents the statistical model adopted for the estimation of
types. For each subject i ∈ {1,...,n}, the vector of observables xi consists
of the play in the twelve diﬀerent games, i.e., xi := (x1
i,...,x12
i ) where xk
i ∈
{A,B,C} is the action played by player i in game k. Furthermore, as already
explained, we hypothesize that each subject i has a behavioral type θ ∈ Θ,
independently and identically drawn from the distribution p ∈ ∆(Θ): each
behavioral type determines a particular play in all games. For instance, in
game 3, Pessimistic plays B, while Altruistic plays A. The aims of our
statistical model is two-fold. Firstly, we want to estimate the distribution p
from the observables. Secondly, we want to assign to each subject his most
likely type (so that we can relate the type of a subject to his measure of
cognitive ability and social preferences).
We assume that in each game k, subject i of type θ plays the action
xk
i(θ) consistent with his type with probability (1 − eθ) and plays any one
of the remaining two actions with probability eθ/2. Note that eθ is type-
speciﬁc, but it does neither depend on the game played nor on the identity
14For inequity aversion, we have used the payoﬀ function ui(ai,aj)−1/2max(uj(ai,aj)−
ui(ai,aj),0)−1/4max(ui(ai,aj)−uj(ai,aj),0) where u is the material/experimental pay-
oﬀ, while for eﬃciency, we have used ui(ai,aj)+0.5uj(ai,aj) if uj(ai,aj) > ui(ai,aj) and
0.5ui(ai,aj) + 0.5uj(ai,aj) if ui(ai,aj) ≥ uj(ai,aj).
19of a subject. It is also worth noting that if eθ = 2/3, a subject uniformly
randomizes over his three actions. This simple observation makes it possible
to identify the L0 type.
Denote xi(θ) the number of actions consistent with type θ out of subject
i’s proﬁle of actions xi, i.e., xi(θ) := |{k : xk
i = xk
i(θ)}|. It follows that the
probability that subject i of type θ plays the sequence xi of actions is:
Pr(xi|eθ,θ) = (1 − eθ)
xi(θ)(eθ/2)
12−xi(θ).












where e is the proﬁle of error rates (eθ)θ. The log-likelihood l((p,e)) of (p,e)












To maximize the log-likelihood l((·,·)) with respect to (p,e), we implement
the EM algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977) (see also Redner and Walker,
1984; Little and Rubin, 1987; El-Gamal and Grether, 1995). More precisely,
the t-th iteration of the algorithm is as follows. Given the current estimate
pt















After some algebra, we obtain that the estimate et












Then, the E(xpectation) step deﬁnes the consistent estimator for the type
distribution pt as pt := (1/n)
Pn
i=1 pt
i and computes p
t+1
i as the Bayesian













Lastly, to initialize the algorithm, ﬁx p1 in the interior of ∆(Θ).15 The
procedure is repeated until convergence. We refer the reader to Redner and
Walker (1984) for more details about the EM algorithm and mixture density
models (as ours).
The conﬁdence intervals are obtained by bootstrapping, as analytical
standard errors are not available.16 For model selection, we use three dif-
ferent criteria for ﬁt and discriminatory power: the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC) adjusted for small samples, the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) and the Average Normalized Entropy (ANE). The lower AIK and BIC
are, the better is the model.
Let pi ∈ ∆(Θ) be the estimated distribution over subject i’s type. Clearly,
if pi is close to the uniform distribution, the estimation is not very informative
about the “true” type of subject i. Alternatively, if pi assigns probability 1
to a particular type, the estimation is very informative. A good measure of
the informativeness of pi is its entropy. More precisely, we use the Average
Normalized Entropy (proposed by El-Gamal and Grether, 1995) as a measure









The ANE takes on values between zero and one. The ANE is zero if
all subjects have an estimated probability of one for one type (a perfect
15We chose the uniform distribution as the initial prior. Yet, our results are robust to
this choice.
16For the bootstrap, we re-sampled the original data with replacement, with the number
of observations equal to the number of observations in the original data, and re-performed
the estimation. After 1000 re-samplings, we used the resulting distributions of estimates
to determine the bootstrap conﬁdence intervals.
21classiﬁcation) and is one if each subject has an estimated distribution that
is uniform. The higher the entropy, the less informative is the model.17
5.3.2 Econometric results
Table 4 reports our estimation results for diﬀerent models. We started with
the full model containing all our types and then eliminated the types with
inconsistent error estimates.18 After removing the inconsistent types, we ar-
rive at Model 1, which includes the same types as in Costa-Gomes et al.
(2001). For model selection, we now proceed in two steps. First, we remove
the types with estimated error rates of close to two-thirds (i.e., Nash, Pes-
simistic, and L3) and replace these types by the type L0.19 A test of whether
this procedure is valid involves the resulting error rate for the L0 type in the
new model (Model 2, second column in table 4). An error rate of close to
two-thirds is required for the new model, Model 2, to pass the test. Since
the error rate for the new type is indeed close to two-thirds, we are conﬁdent
that we successfully identify the L0 types in the sample.
Second, starting from Model 2, we check if reducing the model further
can improve parsimony without worsening the ﬁt. No other reduced model
improves the values of both BIC and AIC. Yet, removing Sophisticated
and D2 (Model 3) improves the BIC score but worsens the AIC score. If,
furthermore, we consider the average normalized entropy ANE, Model 3 out-
performs Model 2 in two of our three criteria for ﬁt and discriminatory power.
All other combinations of the types in Model 1 are dominated in all crite-
ria. Accordingly, we choose Model 3 as our preferred model and use it for
17El-Gamal and Grether (1995) regard values below .38, which was the highest value
they observed in their study, as good.
18Estimated error rates of well above two-thirds imply that subjects played the strategies
consistent with their behavioral types with a lower probability than any of the other two
alternatives.
19Concretely, we created a pseudo-type L0 that plays B with the error rate e. Whenever
e is equal to two-thirds, this pseudo-type is nothing else than the true type L0.
22Type Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
p e p e p e
Nash 0.008 0.767
[0.00;0.14] [0.32;0.87]
Altruist 0.068 0.212 0.071 0.219 0.070 0.214
[0.03;0.16] [0.06;0.45] [0.03;0.15] [0.06;0.45] [0.02;0.16] [0.06;0.42]
Optimist 0.018 0.182 0.020 0.195 0.020 0.196
[0.01;0.08] [0.09;0.98] [0.01;0.10] [0.09;1.00] [0.01;0.12] [0.09;1.00]
Pessimist 0.132 0.722
[0.00,0.18] [0.45;0.84]
L1 0.582 0.247 0.581 0.247 0.599 0.249
[0.44;0.68] [0.20;0.29] [0.45;0.68] [0.21;0.29] [0.49;0.70] [0.22;0.28]
L2 0.147 0.250 0.146 0.249 0.154 0.249
[0.07;0.22] [0.17;0.32] [0.07;0.23] [0.17;0.33] [0.08;0.24] [0.18;0.33]
L3 0.006 0.616
[0.00;0.13] [0.09;0.69]
D1 0.015 0.109 0.015 0.109 0.016 0.111
[0.00,0.06] [0.09;0.74] [0.00;0.09] [0.09;0.75] [0.00;0.07] [0.09;0.75]
D2 0.004 0.154 0.004 0.152
[0.00;0.16] [0.11;0.79] [0.00;0.16] [0.11;0.77]
Sophist. 0.019 0.229 0.020 0.233
[0.00;0.09] [0.16;0.89] [0.00;0.11] [0.16;0.91]
L0 0.143 0.685 0.142 0.678
[0.01;0.18] [0.50;0.91] [0.01;0.20] [0.51;0.84]
ln(L) −1423.627 −1425.704 −1431.824
AIC 2888.090 2883.146 2886.577
BIC 2942.957 2926.962 2919.053
ANE 0.201 0.203 0.200
Table 4: EM estimation of types
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Discriminatory power of the type estimation
Figure 2: Posterior probabilities for subjects being of a certain type
Figure 2 demonstrates further that Model 3 gives a crisp separation of
types. Figure 2 plots the empirical distribution across subjects of the esti-
mated posterior probability p(θ|xi) of type θ for the six types in Model 3. We
observe that for most types, the empirical distribution is concentrated around
0 or 1, which conﬁrms the excellent discriminatory power of our model. This
is further corroborated by the relatively low ANE.
Lastly, we assign to each subject the behavioral type with the highest
estimated posterior probability. More than 73% of subjects have a maximum
20All subsequent ﬁndings are robust to this choice. In fact, only one subject’s type
classiﬁcation changes (from Sophisticated to L2) when we switch from Model 2 to Model
3.
24posterior probability of at least 0.75 and still half of the subjects have a
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Figure 3: Distribution of behavioral types
We ﬁrst note that no subject is best described as the Nash type. This
is largely consistent with the observations made in Section 5.2. Moreover,
the distribution over types in our sample is roughly consistent with existing
ﬁndings. Some of the games in our experiments were ﬁrst used by Costa-
Gomes and Weizs¨ acker (2008), who concluded that their subjects typically
behaved as L1 types. Our results are consistent with this ﬁnding: the most
prevalent type in our sample is the L1 type (roughly 63% of the subjects).
Additionally, in an earlier study, Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) equally found
L1 to be the most prevalent type in their econometric analysis of behavioral
types with information about search patterns. The next largest group of
subjects (15%) are subjects classiﬁed as type L2.21 Note that behaving as
an L2 type is near optimal in our sample, as L1 is the most prevalent type
and L2 best replies to L1.22 We will return to this point in the next section.
21In their econometric analysis of behavioral types without information about search
patterns, Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) found L2 to be most prevalent type.
22A Sophisticated type would certainly do better; but according to Model 3 we did not
25Next, we need to mention that we found a large number of subjects (almost
12%) exhibiting L0 behavior. The remaining subjects were classiﬁed as either
Altruistic (about 6%) or Optimistic (1%).
6 Cognitive ability, preferences and behavior
This ﬁnal section combines our previous results in order to analyze the rela-
tionships between cognitive abilities, preferences and behavior in strategic-
form games.
We ﬁrst analyze the relationships between cognitive ability and behavior.
Prima facie, we would expect subjects with a higher measure of cognitive
ability to display a more sophisticated behavior (e.g., L2) in games. Figure 4
plots the distribution of cognitive abilities per behavioral type. About 70%
of the L2 types have a measure of cognitive ability of two or above and 72%
percent of L0 types have a measure of one. This observation is reassuring as
L0 behavior does not require to put oneself in the position of the opponent,
which subjects with a cognitive ability of one cannot do. On the contrary, L2
behavior does require to put oneself in the position of the opponent, which
subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more can do. Mann Whitney
U-Tests conﬁrm the observation that more sophisticated types have better
cognitive abilities. An L2 type tends to score higher on our cognitive ability
measure than an L1 type and an L0 type (p < 0.01 vs. L0, p < 0.02 vs. L1;
one-sided tests). Also, an L1 type tends to have a slightly better cognitive
ability than an L0 type (p < 0.09).
An additional piece of evidence for the impact of cognitive abilities on
behaviors in strategic-form games is the fact that all Optimistic subjects
have a measure of cognitive ability of one.
Finding 1 There is a positive relationship between cognitive abilities and the
level of strategic sophistication in strategic-form games.






































Types by cognitive ability
Figure 4: Cognitive abilities of diﬀerent types
We now turn our attention to the relationship between the “revealed”
preferences in the dictator game and behavior in strategic-form games. Fig-
ure 5 plots the distributions of behavioral types as a function of the alterna-
tive chosen in the dictator game and cognitive abilities.
Independently of the cognitive ability, the distribution of behavioral types
diﬀers with the alternative chosen in the dictator game (likelihood-ratio χ2-
tests, p < 0.01 and p < 0.02). In particular, the large majority (more than
80%) of Altruistic types have chosen alternative C in the dictator game, the
alternative associated with a taste for social eﬃciency. Moreover, for the
subjects with a cognitive ability of one, this constitutes the main diﬀerence.
Altruistic contributes more than 50% to the χ2 statistic. However, for sub-
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Subjects with cognitive ability of one
Types by dictator−game play and cognitive ability
Figure 5: Choices in dictator games and behavioral types
driven by both Altruistic and L2 types. These two types contribute more
than 55% to the χ2 statistic. A switch from alternative A or C to alter-
native B in the dictator game increases the relative frequency of L2 types
considerably.
Finding 2 Subjects who have chosen the eﬃcient alternative C in the dicta-
tor game are more likely to behave as Altruistic. Conditional on a cognitive
ability of two or more, subjects who have chosen the (selﬁsh) alternative B in
the dictator game are more likely to behave as L2 type than their non-selﬁsh
counterparts.
To understand this last ﬁnding, recall that Lk types are deﬁned with
respect to “selﬁsh” preferences, i.e., assuming that the monetary payoﬀs
28coincide with a subject’s preferences. Also, subjects with a cognitive ability
of two or more have the ability to perform counter-factual reasoning, as the
behavior of an L2 type requires. Both observations explain why the relative
frequency of L2 types is greater among subjects with a cognitive ability of
two or more, who have chosen the (selﬁsh) alternative B in the dictator game.
We now investigate whether there are some treatment eﬀects, i.e., if and
how subjects react to information provided to them. We hypothesize that
subjects with a cognitive ability of one do not react to information about ei-
ther the cognitive ability (red-hat treatment ) or preferences (dictator treat-
ment) or both (fullinfo treatment ) of their opponents, while subjects with a
cognitive ability of two or more do react. Intuitively, the information about
the number of red-hat puzzles the opponent has solved or about the choice
in the dictator game is a signal about the cognitive ability and preferences
of the opponent and, thus, about the opponent’s view of the strategic situa-
tion. To make use of this information, however, requires to be able to think
through the opponent’s eyes, which subjects with a cognitive ability of two
or more can do, while subjects with a cognitive ability of one cannot. Figure
6 shows the distribution of behavioral types per treatment for the subjects
with a cognitive ability of one.
A likelihood ratio χ2-test shows that there is no signiﬁcant association
between the treatment and the type frequencies (p > 0.28). Inspecting the
graph and the contribution to the χ2 statistic reveal that if there is an eﬀect
at all, which is not signiﬁcant though, then it is the near disappearance
of Altruistic and the increase in the frequency of L0 types in the dictator
treatment.
Finding 3 Subjects with a cognitive ability of one do not signiﬁcantly react
to information. If at all, information about the dictator games decreases the
fraction of Altruistic types and increases the fraction of L0 types.







































Subjects with cognitive ability of one
Types by information condition
Figure 6: Treatments and behavioral types (subjects with a cognitive ability
of one)
Figure 6 shows the distribution of behavioral types per treatment for these
subjects. Visual inspection suggests that there is an association between the
treatments and the distribution of types. A likelihood ratio χ2-test conﬁrms
this (p < 0.065).
A closer analysis of the types that contribute the most to the likelihood ra-
tio χ2 score shows that these are L2 and Altruistic. The Altruistic score con-
tribution in the dictator treatment is about 40% of the total score, whereas
the contribution of the L2 types across all treatments is close to 30%. This
implies that the diﬀerences in type distributions across treatments are largely
driven by the changes in relative frequencies of these two types.













































Subjects with cognitive ability of two or more
Types by information condition
Figure 7: Treatments and behavioral types (subjects with a cognitive ability
of two or more)
noinfo and red-hat treatments, i.e., the treatments with no information about
the choice in the dictator game, while there are Altruistic types in the two
other treatments. Moreover, in the treatments where information about the
dictator games was revealed, three-quarters of the subjects behaving as Al-
truistic have observed their opponents choosing alternative A or C in the
dictator game, i.e., a “non-selﬁsh” alternative. This provides some evidence
that Altruistic type chose the socially eﬃcient allocation after strategic con-
siderations.23
Finding 4 A subject with a cognitive ability of two or more is more likely
23All the subjects with higher cognitive ability classiﬁed as Altruists had chosen a
non-selﬁsh option.
31to behave as Altruistic if he is informed that his opponent did not choose the
“selﬁsh” alternative in the dictator game.
Lastly, we consider the diﬀerences between treatments noinfo, red-hat and
fullinfo. See Figure 7. From the noinfo treatment to the red-hat treatment,
the fraction of L2 types increases by about 130%, whereas the increase is
even greater from the dictator treatment to the fullinfo treatment (more
than 250%). The increase of the fraction of L2 types comes at the expense
of L1 types (and also the L0 types in the red-hat treatment). Furthermore,
it is illuminating to consider the sub-sample of subjects who have chosen the
selﬁsh alternative in the dictator game. In that sub-sample, we are only left
with k-level types plus a few D1 types; Altruistic and Optimistic disappear.
The fraction of L2 types doubles: from 0.25 to 0.5 from the noinfo treatment
to the red-hat treatment and from 0.22 to 0.44 from the dictator treatment
to the fullinfo treatment. A Mann-Whitney U-test conﬁrms that “selﬁsh”
subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more behave more sophisticatedly
in treatments where information about the cognitive abilities of opponents
is provided (p < 0.05, one-tailed).
Finding 5 Subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more behave more so-
phisticatedly when information about the cognitive abilities of opponents is
provided.
A simple explanation for the shift towards more sophisticated behavior
when information about the cognitive abilities of others is given is as fol-
lows. Without information, subjects with a cognitive ability of two or more
are overconﬁdent about their own cognitive abilities and expect most other
subjects to have worse cognitive abilities. With information, however, sub-
jects have to revise their expectation upwards. This explains the signiﬁcant
increase of the number of L2-types at the expense of L1-types. Moreover,
since L2 best replies to L1 and L1 is the most prevalent type in the sample,
L2 is nearly optimal. In fact, compared to Sophisticated, the ideal of game
theory, L2’s loss in payoﬀ (in our sample) is only 1.15%. In other words, L2
32types make almost 99% of the payoﬀ a Sophisticated type would have made,
and L2 is a substantially simpler heuristic. In sharp contrast, behaving as
a Nash type would have guaranteed no more than 90% of the payoﬀ of a
Sophisticated type. In our experiment, behaving as an L2 type proved to be
an extremely sophisticated behavior.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the relation between cognitive abilities and behavior
in strategic-form games. To this end, we ﬁrst measured subjects’ cognitive
abilities with the help of a computerized version of the red-hat puzzle. A
large fraction (47.4% according to our conservative measure) of subjects were
able to perform counter-factual reasoning and showed the cognitive ability
required to put themselves in the position of their opponents. These subjects
satisﬁed one of the most essential idea of Game Theory, strategic thinking.
In a second step, we estimated behavioral types from the choices made
by the subjects in the twelve strategic-form games and related it to the
subjects’ cognitive abilities. Prima facie, the behavior of our subjects did not
seem very sophisticated, since we did not ﬁnd evidence for Equilibrium or
Rational expectation types. Closer inspection revealed that subjects showed
a remarkable level of sophistication though. Comparing the subjects without
the ability to perform counter-factual reasoning with the subjects with this
ability revealed a large shift from L0 and L1 types towards L2 and D1. Most
remarkably, types L2 and D1 behaved near optimal. The expected payoﬀ for
these types (given the empirical distribution of choices in the sample) totaled
about 99% of the payoﬀ a subject with rational expectations would have
been able to achieve. For comparison, playing according to Nash equilibrium
would have resulted in a much lower expected payoﬀ of about 88% of the
rational expectation payoﬀ.
Subjects, who were able to perform counter-factual reasoning, also made
use of information on the opponents’ in a sophisticated and proﬁtable man-
33ner. Providing these subjects with information on the opponents’ cognitive
abilities further shifted the type distribution towards the near optimal types
of L2 and D1. This is good news for theories on learning in games. Over
all, the level of strategic sophistication of the subjects with the capacity for
counter-factual reasoning is well beyond our initial expectation.
34A Games
This section presents the 12 games that each subject played. For any i > 1
even, game i is the transposed of the game i − 1. Games 5 and 7 are taken
from Costa-Gomes and v. Weizs¨ acker (2008), while game 9 is adapted from
Costa-Gomes and v. Weizs¨ acker. In parentheses, we indicate the number of
rounds of deletion of strictly dominated strategies required to reach the Nash
equilibrium, while we indicate in bold the Nash payoﬀ. Iteration n consists in
deleting all pure strategies that are strictly dominated when the opponent’s
strategy space is given by the strategies not deleted at iteration n − 1.
A B C
A (47,56) (13,68) (17,17)
B (62,37) (35,45) (19,21)
C (46,21) (20,22) (12,19)
Game 1 :(1,1)
A B C
A (82,63) (44,37) (14,72)
B (92,21) (26,29) (48,36)
C (36,17) (71,41) (16,63)
Game 3 :(2,1)
A B C
A (73,80) (20,85) (91,12)
B (45,48) (64,71) (27,59)
C (40,76) (53,17) (14,98)
Game 5 :(3,2)
A B C
A (74,38) (78,71) (26,43)
B (96,12) (10,89) (37,25)
C (15,51) (83,18) (39,62)
Game 7 :(2,3)
A B C
A (30,59) (34,91) (96,43)
B (36,48) (85,33) (39,18)
C (49,86) (43,14) (25,55)
Game 9 :(4,3)
A B C
A (92,41) (36,26) (24,22)
B (43,17) (70,50) (40,87)
C (75,16) (49,75) (57,35)
Game 11 :(∞,∞)
35B Behavioral types
Table B compactly presents the predicted play of an individual of type θ in
any of our twelve games. In each cell of the table, the vector (·,·) represents
the predicted play of the row player and the column player (the ﬁrst element
corresponds to the row player). For instance, an Altruistic type is predicted
to play A in game G7 as a row player and B as a column player. To obtain
the predicted play in game Gn for n > 1 even, it suﬃces to consider the
play in game G(n−1) and to permute the vector. For instance, in game G4,
pessimistic is predicted to play C as a row player and B as a column player.
Types G1 G3 G5 G7 G9 G11
Altruistic (A,A) (A,A) (A,A) (A,B) (A,C) (A,A)
Pessimistic (B,B) (B,C) (B,B) (C,A) (B,A) (C,B)
Optimistic (B,B) (B,C) (A,C) (B,B) (A,B) (A,C)
L1 (B,B) (B,C) (A,A) (A,B) (A or B,A) (C,B)
L2 (B,B) (B,C) (A,B) (C,A) (C, A or B) (B,B)
D1 (B,B) (B,C) (A,B) (C,B) (B, A) (C,B)
D2 (B,B) (B,C) (B,B) (C,B) (B, A) (C,B)
Sophisticated (B,B) (B,C) (A,B) (A,B) (B, B) (B,B)
Minimax regret (B,B) (A,B) (A,A) (A,B) (A,A) (B or C,B)
Best reply to altruistic (B,B) (B,C) (A,B) (C,B) (A,B) (A,A)
Taste for eﬃciency (B,B) (C,B) (A,A) (A,B) (C,A) (No pure,No pure)
Inequity aversion (B,B) (C,B) (A,A) (A,B) (C,A) (No pure,No pure)
L3 (B,B) (B,C) (B,B) (C,C) (B or C, A) (B,C)
NE (B,B) (B,C) (B,B) (C,C) (C, A) (A,A)
Table 5: Predicted behaviors in all games
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